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n 1631, the political order in the Deccan Plateau of South India was on the 
cusp of significant change as the Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan (r. 1628–58) 
embarked on a major campaign into the region. Understanding the graveness 
of the situation, the sultan of Golkonda, ‘Abdollah Qotb Shah (r. 1627–72) 
delivered the following speech in his court in Hyderabad. His court historian, 
Nezam al-Din Ahmad Shirazi, recorded his words: 
Our laudable ancestor, king and conqueror of the Kingdoms of 
Hendustan, Lord of the Happy Conjunction (saheb-qeran)  … with the 
assistance of the prophet’s pure soul and of the commander of the 
believers ‘Ali (Heydar), and with the help of the sacred spirits of the 
Twelve imams  … struck the heads and necks of the leaders of the vile 
infidels and lowborn Hindus in this country with his strength and power 
of bravery and with his sword that is like Zu’l-feqar … [This way,] he 
conquered his kingdom. He spread the customs of the nation of 
Mohammad and the creed of ‘Ali …1 
In this critical moment, the sultan chose to declare the raison d’être of the 
sultanate in terms of the spread of Islam, clearly in its Shi‘i form, expressed in 
the invocation of ‘Ali, his sword Zu’l-feqar and the Twelve imams. 
Such rhetoric was not uncommon in the courts of the Deccan, and may have 
been used for domestic consumption. After all, when the situation seemed dire, 
members of the court, in particular Persianate nobles who had no special 
attachment to the sultanate, had the option to leave the Qotb Shahi court and join 
the Mughals, as several courtiers did; some two decades later, Mohammad Sa‘id 
Ardestani, better known as Mir Jomla, famously took this very path.2 Therefore, 
a reminder of why the sultan deserved their support was essential. This idiom, 
however, was not limited to internal affairs. Similar language had been employed 
extensively in diplomatic correspondence among the Deccan Sultanates, and 
between them and the Safavids. In the latter case, another element was introduced 
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to the mix: not only general use of Shi‘i tropes, but also more explicit expressions 
of Safavid allegiance. 
Take, for example, an undated letter sent from Ebrahim Qotb Shah of 
Golkonda (r. 1550–80) to the Safavid Shah Tahmasp (r. 1524–76). Opening with 
a long list of Tahmasp’s exalted titles, the letter states that: 
[Qotb Shah] raised the banners of victory with divine help and the good 
fortunes of royal benevolence. He made the rows of the enemies, who 
were collected in the knot of the Pleiades (‘aqd-e sorayya), disperse in the 
manner of Ursa’s tail.3 Now he is in a position to fulfil the obligations of 
governance and to renew old bonds. It is evident that no one before us has 
raised the banner of propagating the imami creed in these lands! No one 
before us has spread the sublime Twelver khotba! Day by day, extreme 
effort has been made to strengthen the foundations of this great creed 
(mellat) and the rules of this superior Shari‘a.4 
Correspondence of this kind marks unambiguous links between the sultans of 
Golkonda and the Safavids, the core of which relies on shared Shi‘i leanings. 
Similar trends can be noted in the case of the neighbouring sultanate of 
Ahmadnagar. In 951/1544, Borhan Nezam Shah (r. 1510–53) sent Khurshah b. 
Qobad al-Huseyni as ambassador to the Safavid court. Having delivered presents 
(pishkesh) from India, Khurshah was granted audience with the shah. In his 
report, the ambassador stated that the shah: 
inquired on the events in India and the circumstances of its rulers. He 
applauded the Refuge of the World (Borhan Nezam Shah) citing his own 
name following His Majesty’s (Shah Tahmasp). The shah demonstrated 
endless kindness towards Shah Taher, who was the cause of the Shi‘i 
following (tashayyo‘) of the Nezam Shah and the reason for the friendship 
and conciliation of the two sides.5 
Similarly to Golkonda, in Ahmadnagar, too, the link with the Safavids was stated 
explicitly as relying on the shared creed. Special attention was given to the 
circumstances of the conversion of Borhan Nezam Shah. According to the 
chronicler Mohammad Qasem Astarabadi (better known by his pen name 
Fereshta), the sultan adopted Shi‘ism after Shah Taher Hoseyni, the sultan’s 
close adviser and confidant, managed to cure his son, Prince ‘Abd al-Qader, 
when all others had failed.6 This version presents a major oddity. Shah Taher was 
most likely an Esma‘ili; however, Borhan converted to Twelver Shi‘ism.7 This 
choice of creed may be an indication that the conversion, at least conceptually, 
had something to do with the Safavids. 
Both Iranian and Deccani sources, then, indicate that the sultanates in the 
Deccan adopted Twelver Shi‘ism as their official creed. The Deccan Sultanates 
are described as Shi‘i states at the margins of the Safavid sphere of influence. 
Modern historiography has followed suit, at times uncritically. Edmund Herzig 
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and Willem Floor pose the question, ‘how important was the religious factor in 
the Safavid alliance with the Shi‘i states of the Deccan?’, thereby stating the 
creed of the sultanates as a matter of fact, without considering what this may 
entail.8 Moojan Momen proposes to fold the sultanates of Ahmadnagar, Bijapur 
and Golkonda into the Shi‘i world by providing only skeletal details: conversion, 
migration of Shi‘i ulema and Safavid links.9 Juan Cole argues that the Deccani 
courts modelled themselves after the Safavids in a linear story that begins with 
the proclamation of Shi‘ism as the state religion and ends with the Mughal 
conquest. The less straightforward case of Bijapur is depicted similarly, by 
saying that ‘Shi‘ism remained influential at this court, with a one or two-decade 
interlude, until late in the sixteenth century’. Cole thereby ignores the long 
interval between the end of the sixteenth century and the Mughal conquest in 
1686.10 A similar approach is adopted by Roger Savory. Challenging E.G. 
Browne’s claim that the Safavid period did not produce any great poets, he asks 
‘how was it that many Safavid poets flourished in the three Shi‘i courts in India: 
Ahmadnagar, Golconda and Bijapur?’.11 
Modern historiography of India presents a similar approach. The prominent 
historian H.K. Sherwani argues that the relations between the Qotb Shahi sultans 
of Golkonda and the Safavids strengthened as Shi‘ism became prevalent under 
the Safavids. He attributes the significance of the Safavids in the sultanate purely 
to religious issues.12 M.A. Nayeem offers a similar narrative regarding Bijapur, 
pointing to the temporal proximity in the introduction of that creed in both 
sultanates. He further suggests that ‘the Perso-Bijapur collaboration in political 
and religious affairs had its repercussions not only on cultural and intellectual 
activities of the ‘Adel Shahi Sultans, but its impact penetrated deep into various 
aspects of life and society in Bijapur’.13 In his study of Shi‘i Islam in India, Justin 
Jones mentions the ‘Shi‘a-informed dynasties in the Deccani South’, where many 
‘established Shi‘a cultural forms’,14 without discussing their extent or impact. 
The historiography that positions the Deccan Sultanates in ideological and 
diplomatic proximity to the Safavids is only to be expected. The sultanates 
emerged almost in parallel to the Safavids, whose historiography was marked by 
strong association with that creed. The Persian-speaking elite communities of the 
Deccan were influential in shaping political life there while maintaining intimate 
links to their ancestral lands. Accordingly, Persian sources of the Deccan, which 
were composed by members of the same community, promoted this vision as 
part of their appeal both to the Safavid rulers and to the wider Persianate world. 
As a result, the Deccan Sultanates, based on the proclamations found in their 
official chroniclers, were understood not only as Shi‘i states, but in the Safavid 
form; the Safavids were assumed to be the gold standard against which the 
meaning of Shi‘i following was weighed. 
However, the political, social and cultural circumstances in the Deccan varied 
significantly from those in Iran. Can we assume that the Safavid model was 
transferred to the Deccan in full? In this chapter I seek to question this 
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assumption. Focusing on the sultanate of Bijapur under the rule of the Shi‘i ‘Ali 
I (r. 1558–80) and the Sunni Ebrahim II (r. 1580–1627), I argue that the meaning 
of Shi‘i state in the Deccan was significantly different from that in Iran. Showing 
more continuity than change between the two sultans, I suggest that many of the 
assumptions around their reigns were based on the importation of tropes that 
developed outside the subcontinent and could not be easily applied there. Instead, 
a careful inquiry into local circumstances demonstrates that the term ‘Shi‘i’ in 
this context reflects a superficial label that has been neither all-encompassing nor 
total, as it was in Safavid Iran. 
Historiography of Binaries: Two Frameworks 
The identification of the Deccan Sultanates as Shi‘i states is closely associated 
with historiographical trends constructed around questions of empire and early 
modernity. A growing body of literature produces a comparative framework for 
the analysis of the Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal Empires. The three were treated 
as interlinked entities, sharing similar beliefs, connected to the Turko-Mongol 
past and reliance on Perso-Islamic traditions.15 This process involved the 
crystallization and emergence of new religious orthodoxies, accompanied by the 
creation of legalistic discourses, all aimed at supporting the universalist claims 
of the rulers.16 This process is particularly evident in the Safavid and Ottoman 
cases. 
The Safavids began officially to proclaim their following of the Shi‘i creed 
with the establishment of their political rule in 1501. Their notion of Shi‘ism, 
however, continued to evolve with the changing political and ideological 
circumstances in the state. At first based heavily on ideas of messianism and 
extremism under the charismatic leadership of Shah Esma‘il I (r. 1501–24), from 
the early 1530s the dynasty began to develop the more formal and doctrinal 
approaches of Twelver Shi‘ism. This version of Shi‘ism leaned increasingly 
heavily on the work of religious scholars, in part rejecting concepts of 
mysticism.17 Various Sufi orders began to be suppressed, first those solely 
identified as Sunnis, such as the Naqshbandis, later even the Ne‘matollahis, who, 
from the beginning of Safavid rule, had allied themselves with the new dynasty.18 
By the time of Shah ‘Abbas I (r. 1587–1629), Twelver Shi‘ism in its clerical, 
Shari‘a-bound form was established at the heart of the empire as part of the effort 
to construct an integrated state system.19 
Sunni orthodoxy became well established at the centre of the Ottoman 
Empire. From the late fifteenth and into the sixteenth century, learned classes 
were politicized and integrated into the imperial mechanism, producing an image 
of a state based on the Shari‘a and justice. The intensified imperial order was 
supported by an evolving administrative and legalistic discourse and a 
bureaucratic apparatus, all with the aim of realizing the sultans’ universalist 
claims.20 Central to this project, suggests Hüseyin Yılmaz, was the concept of 
the caliphate, now reworked to allow its convergence with messianic ideas. This 
SHI‘I RULERS, SAFAVID ALLIANCE 221 
new form enabled the sultans to promote their sovereignty against similar claims 
of rival dynasties, Muslim and European alike, as well as within their own 
realm.21 Signs of heterodoxy were repressed throughout by the direct 
intervention of the central administration, while establishing approved elements 
(such as certain Sufi orders) in lieu of those considered too far from orthodoxy. 
These steps enhanced the crystallization of orthodoxy and the emergence of 
dichotomies between orthodox/heterodox, Sunni/Shi‘i.22 
The result of the respective realignments of both dynasties was an intensified 
language of religious conflict. States and groups were labelled as either Sunni or 
Shi‘i, promoting a growing distinction – and hostility – between the two creeds.23 
The early modern period as a whole was perceived as an environment in which 
conflict between those two increasingly crystallized creeds was rife. These new 
binaries not only affected society within states but also served to define the 
relationship between dynasties. Beyond the direct Safavid–Ottoman conflict, 
works analysing Mughal–Ottoman and Mughal–Safavid relations referred to 
religion as a major issue. Religious sensitivities were evoked in the never-
realized possibility of an all-Sunni alliance, comprising the Ottomans, Ozbeks 
and Mughals, against the Shi‘i Safavids. The same sensitivities were used to 
explain the tensions between the Ottomans and the Mughals regarding 
acceptance of the Ottoman claims to caliphate.24 In this historiographical 
environment, it was clear that the Deccan Sultanates ought to have been 
categorized as belonging to either side of the conflict. 
The growing distinction between political Shi‘a and Sunna, however, is not 
the only paradigm within which the Deccan Sultanates were examined. Upon 
arriving in the subcontinent, the binary scheme encountered the local 
circumstances, which were radically different from those in west Asia. At the 
heart of the local system stood a different set of binaries. To understand the local 
setting, let us diverge momentarily to consider the development of Muslim 
society in the Deccan. 
Muslim rule in the region began during the reign of Mohammad b. Toghloq 
(r. 1325–51), sultan of Delhi. Under his rule, Muslim governors from north India 
were posted in towns in the Deccan, whereas other Muslims settled as rural 
landholders. In parallel, the position of certain pre-existing Hindu elites as landed 
gentry was confirmed and they were introduced into the service of the sultanate 
as assignment holders.25 Furthermore, in 1327, the sultan pronounced 
Dowlatabad in the northern Deccan his secondary capital, forcing nobles and 
civilians from the north to settle there. Others were lured by money or land 
grants. The short-lived project incentivized many to relocate to the Deccan, 
including Sufis, ulema and other members of the Muslim intellectual and 
political elites.26 These Muslims, who became the kernel of the Deccani Muslim 
society, gradually developed their own language, Dakhani, an amalgamation of 
north Indian languages but influenced by local vernaculars.27 
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In 1347, Delhi’s rule collapsed and was succeeded by the locally grown 
Bahmani dynasty. The sultanate reflects a large degree of continuation of both 
Toghloq and local pre-Delhi titles and institutions, and both localized Muslims 
and Hindus played a significant part in various military and administrative 
roles.28 Of particular importance were Sufis, welcomed in the region by the 
Bahmanis as part of their effort to construct their legitimacy as a rebel dynasty 
in an overwhelmingly Hindu environment. Two north Indian orders, the 
Cheshtiya and the Joneydiya, and one Iranian order, the Qaderiya, took root in 
the region.29 Notable among these was the Cheshti Sheykh Mohammad Hoseyni, 
better known as Khvaja Banda Navaz Gesu Daraz (d. 1422), who settled in the 
Bahmani capital, Gulbarga. Gesu Daraz established a new spiritual line within 
the Cheshti tradition. At the same time, he created a political centre opposing that 
of the sultan.30 The emergence of strong local Muslim elites, with their own 
linguistic identity, links to the place, association with certain Sufi orders and 
connections to Hindu elites, alerted the sultans. Consequently, Ahmad I (r. 1422–
36) decided to engineer a new elite group from the new capital city he established 
in Bidar. He invited Iranians to settle, and increasingly relied on their services to 
run the sultanate. Self-styled ‘Foreigners’ (ghariban), these Persian-speaking 
elites became central in politics, administration and scholarship as well as 
international trade.31 The sultan further invited Ne‘matollahi Sufis to settle in 
Bidar. Of this family, Shah Khalilollah gained great importance in the capital. 
His hospice linked together Foreigners, Sufis and the royal family, but did not 
extend far beyond these circles.32 
The shift of power created tensions between Deccanis and Foreigners. These 
tensions became the hallmark of Deccani politics, even if modern historiography 
tends to exaggerate their extent; after all, the Bahmani sultanate remained 
relatively stable for well over a century.33 Nevertheless, a crisis of leadership in 
Bidar from the 1480s brought heightened tensions and the rapid collapse of 
Bahmani authority. By the turn of the sixteenth century, five de facto independent 
dynasties had emerged. Most important were the Nezam Shahs of Ahmadnagar, 
‘Adel Shahs of Bijapur and Qotb Shahs of Golkonda.34 The question of their 
sovereignty remains contested, however; we will return to this point later. With 
this newly acquired status, the sultanates, collectively known as the Deccan 
Sultanates, acknowledged each other’s independence. None made any sweeping 
claims for sovereignty over the entirety of the former Bahmani domains.35 
Within this system, the Deccani–Foreigner issue remained a significant 
framework in the history of the sultanates. Based on the development of the two 
groups, they were often perceived as total and all-encompassing opposites. Their 
contradictory characterization comprised several elements: the Deccanis were 
identified with the Dakhani language. Associated with the locality, they were 
considered to be susceptible to Indic culture and to cooperation with non-
Muslims. D.C. Verma suggests, quite dramatically, that the Deccanis were 
primarily the descendants of local converts who were ‘half Hindus in feelings, 
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thought, speech, customs and dress’ and ‘had retained their way of life and 
outlook’.36 The other group, namely the Foreigners, were linked to transregional 
networks. They were mostly Persian speakers, thus related to Persianate culture 
and to the wider Muslim world. Therefore, they were perceived as less 
sympathetic to Indic culture. This is reflected in the literary production of the 
two groups: the Foreigners wrote in Persian, the Deccanis solely in Dakhani.37 
This clearly marked cultural distinction has naturally attracted scholarly 
attention. M.A. Nayeem suggests that the difference between Deccanis and 
Foreigners was racial; he even employs cranial morphology to make his point.38 
A less objectionable approach emphasized the relations with the locality. Trying 
to create a more harmonious understanding of the sultanates, and in line with the 
twentieth-century project of state-building in India, H.K. Sherwani coined the 
terms ‘New-comers’ (Foreigners) and ‘Old-comers’ (Deccanis). With these 
terms, he acknowledged the genealogy of the elite clusters as fundamental in 
shaping the complex relationship between them.39 S.R. Sharma emphasizes the 
unique nature of Deccani culture, stating that, due to the isolation of the 
community, its culture developed differently from those of the foreign 
Muslims.40 Among these suggestions, a common attempt to explain the conflict 
was in terms of creed. Considering the origin of each group and the broader 
historical development in the early modern period, Foreigners now became 
associated with the Shi‘i creed, and the Deccanis with Sunni Islam. Not only the 
elites but even the rulers themselves were included in this division, associating 
each sultan’s creed with a preferential treatment of their co-religionists-cum-elite 
group, while subduing rivals.41 
The collision of the two binaries, then, creates a clear distinction between two 
groupings. On the one hand stood the Foreigners, who were associated with the 
cosmopolitan Persianate world and transregional networks; as such, they were 
viewed as indifferent, if not hostile, to the Deccani environment and Indic 
culture, and therefore not likely to cooperate with Hindu elites. Identified as 
Shi‘i, and following the developments in the Safavid realm, they were also 
increasingly depicted as hostile towards Sufism, with the possible exception of 
the Ne‘matollahi order.42 The Deccanis were perceived as the mirror image of 
the Foreigners. Closely linked with the Deccan rather than anywhere else in the 
subcontinent or the outside world, they were understood as operating along local 
lines. Associated with the Dakhani language, they were only happy to cooperate 
with Hindu elites and showed sympathies to both Indic culture and the 
vernaculars. As Sunnis they were also closely associated with Sufism. This 
scheme is presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Attributed differences of Foreigners and Deccanis 
 Foreigners Deccanis 
Orientation Cosmopolitan Local 
Language Persian Dakhani; vernaculars 
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Creed Shi‘i Sunni 
Culture Perso-Islamic Islamic/Indic 
Sufism Hostile  Sympathetic  
Bijapur and the Dissolution of Binaries 
To what extent can we assume that this binary model offers a viable 
representation of political life in the Deccan? The sultanate of Bijapur provides 
an interesting case study to examine the model’s validity. Unlike its neighbours 
in Golkonda, whose rulers were Shi‘i from the establishment of the dynasty, and 
in Ahmadnagar, where the sultans adopted that creed early on, the ‘Adel Shahi 
rulers of Bijapur reflect a more changeable story. The sultanate emerged around 
1490 under the Shi‘i Yusof ‘Adel Khan (d. 1510), a Foreigner in Bahmani 
service. Throughout the sixteenth century, the rulers’ creed changed constantly: 
Yusof’s successor Esma‘il (r. 1510–34) remained Shi‘i, Ebrahim I (r. 1535–58) 
was Sunni, ‘Ali I (1558–80) Shi‘i and Ebrahim II (1580–1627) again Sunni. 
As Bijapur inherited many of its elite structures from the Bahmanis, including 
the Foreigner–Deccani divide, these switches led scholars to assume that such 
changes in the rulers’ creed meant that the sultanate as a whole changed its course 
radically. A notable example of this approach is provided by Richard Eaton and 
Phillip Wagoner. They describe the Shi‘i Esma‘il as ‘devoted to foreign – that is, 
Persian – culture’, therefore he ‘seldom spoke the Dakhni language, and also 
vowed that he would never enlist Deccanis and Habshis (Ethiopian military 
slaves) in his service’. He even ‘ordered his entire army to wear scarlet caps with 
twelve points’ in the Safavid manner. In contrast, Esma‘il’s Sunni son Ebrahim 
I ‘fervently favored Deccanis’, preferred vernaculars over Persian and prohibited 
the Safavid cap. Moreover, he changed the language of revenue accounts and 
judicial records from Persian to the local vernaculars, Marathi and Kannada, and 
appointed Brahmins in the administrate system. Ebrahim later integrated 
elements from the local, pre-Islamic Western Chalukya Empire in his public 
architecture.43 
This kind of narrative is limited in several points. It is not clear how sweeping 
and clear-cut those changes were. No evidence for literary patronage of either 
Marathi or Kannada by Bijapur’s elites is noted (but this may be the result of 
limited scholarly attention). Furthermore, the boundaries between language at 
the time are questionable. Sumit Guha suggests that early state documents in 
Marathi, while written in Modi script, were comprised mostly of Persian 
vocabulary and even grammar, with only occasional terms and verbs taken from 
Marathi.44 
The problems run much deeper. The scheme of radical change itself reflects 
the persistence of the colonial-era perception of Great Men, in which the ruler 
alone sets the tone for his kingdom. This notion had been used already in the 
early nineteenth century by James Mill, to whom the declared religion of the ruler 
defined the entire era.45 That Eaton and Wagoner follow this idea is striking, 
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considering that elsewhere they both rightfully reject the similarly clear-cut, 
generations-old and outdated division between Muslims and Hindus.46 
Moreover, the scheme assumes extreme discontinuities in the history of Bijapur, 
in particular when compared with Ahmadnagar and Golkonda. This assumption 
is questionable if we consider the resilience and stability of the sultanate, which 
until the mid-seventeenth century retained its position as the strongest state in the 
Deccan. Furthermore, total changes imply monolithic views of each group. 
However, this might be a gross oversimplification: consider how diverse must be 
the opinions among the members of a group comprising local Muslims, Ethiopian 
military slaves, Marathas and Kannada-speaking Brahmins. 
A careful examination of the two sultans that followed Ebrahim I  
demonstrate the problems in this model. Ebrahim I’s son, ‘Ali I, ascended the 
throne of Bijapur in 1558 at the age of 16, even though it is reported that his 
father was reluctant to promote him due to his Shi‘i inclinations. Nevertheless, 
the prince enjoyed the support of both the nobles and the larger population; upon 
Ebrahim’s death, he was selected to succeed him.47 Under ‘Ali’s rule, state power 
expanded considerably, in particular following the defeat of the formidable 
neighbour to the south, Vijayanagara, in 1565. Extensive construction projects 
mark the turning of Bijapur into a major political centre. During these important 
developments, ‘Ali’s Shi‘i inclination did not result in the anticipated exclusions. 
No change of administrative language is recorded, of the kind mentioned under 
Ebrahim I. Even though ‘Ali is said to have favoured Foreigners, Hindus 
continued to serve in the royal armies. Some attained high rank, including various 
generals and the auditor-general (majmu‘-e mamalek), Daso Pandit, whose 
family remained interlinked with the ‘Adel Shahs into the reign of Ibrahim II.48 
An interesting reflection of ‘Ali’s association with Hindus can be found in an 
inscription on the newly built city wall, stating that the segment was built by one 
Pandit Nandji. Underneath the inscription, a ritualistic Chalukya-period gate is 
integrated into the wall, resonating with localized historical memory.49 Another 
inscription on the wall opens with the Shi‘i formula ‘No hero like ‘Ali! No sword 
like Zu’l-feqar!’.50 While this kind of statement is only to be anticipated under a 
Shi‘i ruler, it is surprising that the person associated with the use of this language 
was a Hindu named Jagdeva Rao. 
Sufis, too, were not shunned. Rafi‘ al-Din Shirazi reports that the sultan was 
fascinated by Muslim and Hindu ascetics, and constantly sought their company.51 
This kind of Shi‘i–Sufi association was commonplace in the Deccan, and was 
not limited to the Ne‘matollahis. Most visible are funerary practices that brought 
sultans and saints into close spatial (and spiritual) proximity. The first two sultans 
of the ‘Adel Shahi dynasty, both Shi‘i, were buried in a royal necropolis in Gogi, 
some 110 km east of Bijapur, near the resting place of the Sufi Sheykh Chanda 
Hoseyni (d. 1454).52 This reflects continuity with the Bahmani sultans, whose 
necropolis near Bidar was built in proximity to the tomb of the Ne‘matollahi 
Shah Khalilollah (d. 1455).53 ‘Ali I broke this tradition, as his mausoleum moved 
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away from Gogi to Bijapur. Yet, as Deborah Hutton suggests, his tomb reflects 
important aspects of continuity: ‘Ali’s modest mausoleum was modelled after 
Gogi’s royal tombs and was built near, and in association with, the tombs of 
Qaderi Sufis’.54 Correspondence between Bijapur and Golkonda during his reign 
evokes the name of the Cheshti saint Gesu Daraz.55 ‘Ali’s Sufi sympathies 
correspond with the wider Shi‘ite–Sufi affinity in the Deccan. An early 
seventeenth-century painting, titled ‘Dervish receiving a visitor’, depicts Shi‘i 
‘alams (metal banners, typically carried in the Shi‘i procession on ‘Ashura) 
resting on a Sufi shrine.56 In the unequivocally Shi‘i Golkonda, too, Sufis were 
highly esteemed: they were second only to the sultans in the prominent place 
given to their tombs in the royal necropolis near Golkonda Fort, and their tombs 
shared similar architecture to those of the sultans. Marital connections cemented 
the links between Qotb Shahi sultans and prominent Sufis.57 
‘Ali’s links with local elites were not solely utilitarian. A deeper engagement 
is expressed in a curious work, titled Nojum al-‘olum. Composed in Persian 
before 1570, probably by the sultan himself, the Nojum is an innovative 
composition which brings together esoteric knowledge from Indic, Hellenic, 
Central Asian, Persian and Islamic traditions, in writing and with hundreds of 
illustrations. The work elaborates on ideas of kingship, which included the Indic 
concept of the sultan as universal ruler (chakravartin), thus reflecting an 
exchange within the composite environment of the Deccan and with Indic 
concepts.58 Furthermore, Emma Flatt suggests that ‘Ali promoted a territorial 
claim that connected him to particular places in the Deccan, even beyond his own 
realm.59 Similarly to the reign of Ebrahim I, ‘Ali, too, made use of Chalukya 
symbols. Eaton and Wagoner demonstrate that, under ‘Ali, a Chalukya-era 
temple in newly conquered Bankapur was converted into a mosque while 
maintaining its original form. This conversion serves as an example of the 
integration of local pasts into the expanding sultanate.60 Another sign of this 
engagement is in the major musical treatise Sangitaratnakara. Katherine Butler 
Schofield suggests that this work was translated from Sanskrit into Dakhani in 
Bijapur around 1570.61 Considering ‘Ali’s personal involvement, his engagement 
with the locality seems more than merely Realpolitik, but rather the reflection of 
a deeper affiliation with the local idiom, contrary to what might be expected from 
a Shi‘i ruler. 
The childless ‘Ali I was succeeded in 1580 by his nephew Ebrahim II, who 
soon changed the sultanate’s official creed to Sunnism. According to the standard 
historiography, this would therefore presuppose that he would prefer Deccanis 
over Foreigners, be disinterested in Persian and the Persianate world, 
demonstrate localization and heavily engage with Sufis.62 Much of this does 
indeed reflect Ebrahim’s interests. Remembered for his contribution to the 
development of a unique, localized and hybrid courtly culture, his royal identity 
was constructed around the deliberately ambiguous concept of nowras. This term 
carries a double meaning: in Persian, nowras means ‘newly arrived’, reflecting 
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the sultan’s youth and innovation; in Sanskrit, nava rasa (written as nowras in 
nasta‘liq) or nine rasas (emotional essences) are associated with music and are 
experienced through the senses.63 Ebrahim composed Ketab-e nowras, a 
collection of songs in Dakhani, written to be sung to classical Indian music. 
Laden with Sanskrit terminology, this composition reflects aesthetics and themes 
related to Indic poetry. The verses famously invoke Sarasvati (goddess of 
knowledge and music), the Prophet Mohammad and the Cheshti Sufi Gesu 
Daraz.64 On the other side of this alleged zero-sum game, Ebrahim was also 
reported to have only rudimentary knowledge of Persian. Famously, the Mughal 
ambassador Asad Beg Qazvini, who visited Bijapur in 1603, reports that Ebrahim 
spoke only broken (shekasta) Persian.65 
A careful examination of the evidence, however, suggests a much deeper 
engagement with elements which were considered to belong to the ‘Foreign’ 
side. Keelan Overton demonstrates the variety of Persianate intellectuals who 
settled in Bijapur during the reign of Ebrahim II, thanks to the ‘welcoming 
climate for foreigners’. The Foreigners were central to the intellectual scene of 
the capital, linking it to the world of Persianate cosmopolitanism.66 These circles 
included the leading poets Nur al-Din Mohammad Zohuri and Malek Qommi, 
who migrated from Ahmadnagar, and Zohuri’s son, Zahur, who composed the 
chronicle Mohammadnama for Ebrahim’s successor, Mohammad.67 The Shi‘i 
intellectual Khvaja Sa‘d al-Din ‘Enayatollah Shirazi, along with the poets Molla 
Shakibi and ‘Enayatollah Ardestani, arrived in Bijapur, entered royal service, and 
received land grants (soyurghal). Khvaja Sa‘d al-Din became Ebrahim’s close 
counsellor with a new title, Shah Nawaz Khan.68 Royal patronage was extended 
to the historians Rafi‘ al-Din Shirazi and Fereshta, who composed Persian 
chronicles for the sultan. The climate of openness towards the Islamicate, 
particularly Persianate, cosmopolitan world, is reflected in the contents of 
Ebrahim’s library and its function as a nodal point for the circulation of 
manuscripts in Persian and Arabic. Overton suggests that the library contributed 
to the creation of Ebrahim’s firm image as a Muslim sovereign.69 
Fereshta’s personal testimony is particularly revealing. In sections not 
included in the oft-used translation by John Briggs, the chronicler depicts a ruler 
who was deeply involved in Persianate culture and language. He reports that, at 
a time when he was facing financial difficulties, he attended a royal council 
(majles), where the sultan personally increased his rank (mansab) and land grant 
(eqta‘). The sultan then gave the chronicler a copy of Tarikh-e Rowzat al-safa’ 
and ordered him to write an ‘honest’ account on his reign in that manner.70 
Fereshta further suggests that the sultan recognized the need to learn Persian and 
made an effort to master the language. Ebrahim started by reading one or two 
lines of a report, gradually progressing to poetry and prose, until becoming well 
versed in the language.71 Even if we choose not to accept Fereshta’s favourable 
report unreservedly, it is clear that the official chronicler saw it as crucial to 
depict his patron as part of the cosmopolitan Persianate world. 
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Other references link Ebrahim more directly to the Shi‘i creed. In Golzar-e 
Ebrahim, Zohuri mentions the sultan’s ‘good fortune of submission to the 
illustrious Shari‘a of Mostafa (i.e. Mohammad), and the felicity of raising the 
banner of friendship for Mortaza (i.e. ‘Ali)’, to which he adds that ‘a proof of his 
pure nature [is] his love of the pure Imams’.72 A similar reference to ‘Ali can be 
found on copper coins from his reign.73 An even more direct reference appears 
in yet another (not translated) section from Fereshta. The chronicler reports that 
in Moharram of 1004/September 1595, the sultan encamped to perform the Shi‘i 
rites of mourning. In the following year, the Shi‘i scholar Mir Mohammad Saleh 
Hamadani arrived in India. Ebrahim organized a royal reception for him. On the 
tenth day of Moharram, the sultan performed the mourning rites, ‘in accordance 
with the custom of previous years’. He then invited Mir Mohammad to join him 
in Bijapur’s citadel. When the caravan approached, the sultan ‘walked on foot a 
long way to receive him, and performed a prostration (sejda) of thanksgiving’, 
showing particular reverence to the Shi‘i scholar.74 
Ebrahim ‘Adel Shah II, just like his uncle ‘Ali I before him, did not conform 
to the restrictive model. ‘Ali’s Shi‘i inclinations and Ebrahim’s Sunnism did not 
determine their approach in many ways. On the contrary, instead of a narrative 
of abrupt changes, and notwithstanding the declaration of changing creeds, both 
sultans demonstrate a large degree of continuity in all aspects: from language and 
employment to royal imagery and architecture.75 Even in religious issues, much 
continuity can be observed: this included veneration of Sufis, and even in Shi‘i 
rituals proper. It was not only Bijapur that defied the model; in Golkonda, too, 
the Shi‘i rulers created direct links to the pre-Muslim past by constantly referring 
to the heritage of the pre-Islamic Kakatiya dynasty, by providing patronage to 
literary works in Telugu as well as Dakhani, and by maintaining their links with 
Sufis.76 All this suggests that we should reject outright the rigid model of clear 
distinction between Sunni and Shi‘i rulers and the implications thereof. 
Shi‘i States of the Deccan? 
The direction that the various sultans of the Deccan took in their policies with 
regard to the local scene, other creeds, the Hindu population and Sufis 
differentiated them from their contemporaries in Iran. Instead of sectarian 
schism, as reflected within the Safavid realm and in the relations with their 
neighbours, the sultans of the Deccan preferred inclusive policies. With 
continuous patronage of Sufis and Hindus, and without any sign of enforcing 
their creed over the Muslim population, which remained overwhelmingly 
Sunni,77 it appears that applying the Safavid standards to the Deccan contributes 
little to our understanding of the region. This inapplicability derives from the 
special circumstances which emerged in the early modern Deccan. Unlike the 
Ottomans and Safavids, the Deccan Sultanates lacked any unified political centre 
that could impose its ideas on the population. Moreover, facing competition from 
sister-sultanates and threats from powerful neighbours, first Gujarat and 
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Vijayanagara and later the Mughals, the very survival of the sultanates depended 
on their ability to secure the cooperation of various elites. Those included 
Deccani Muslims, Ethiopian military slaves, Hindu military and administrative 
groups, and Persian-speaking Foreigners. The elites had other options, from non-
cooperation to joining the rivals, giving them leverage in their negotiations with 
the sultans. These circumstances encouraged the political culture of the region to 
take the opposite direction to that of the contemporary empires: instead of an 
increasingly authoritative centre with clear ideological preferences, the sultans 
encouraged the concurrence of multiple voices.78 
This polyvocality may be the key to understanding the seeming contradiction 
between continuity and change. The changes in the political language of Bijapur, 
or the lack thereof, illustrate this point. Allegedly related to the opposite poles of 
Bijapur’s courtly culture, in reality ‘Ali I and Ebrahim II were not so different 
from one another. Both demonstrated keen interest in Indic culture and were 
involved in literary production in local traditions, either directly or by providing 
the conditions for them to flourish in their court. Both were associated with 
patronage of Persian culture and Shi‘i learning and kept cordial relations with the 
Safavids while maintaining links to Sufi saints; both similarly challenged the neat 
division of the court into two contradictory and competing traditions. 
To this we should add the official language used by the sultans towards the 
Safavids. As we have seen before, this language presents a direct expression of 
alliance towards the empire, not only politically but also ideologically. A curious 
example is a letter from Ebrahim II to Shah ‘Abbas I, sent in early 1623: 
The lands of the Deccan form as much a part of the Safavid Empire as 
the provinces of Iraq, Fars, Khorasan, and Azerbaijan. Accordingly, the 
names of the Safavid monarchs have been recited in the sermon and will 
continue to be recited in future. Our forefathers were appointed to rule 
over these territories and protect them by His Majesty’s ancestors. So our 
function is to rule the countries on his Majesty’s behalf and defend them 
against foreign aggression.79 
The letter states that the Sunni sultan of Bijapur not only acknowledged the 
Safavid role in appointing the ‘Adel Shahi sultans (a doubtful statement, 
considering that the ‘Adel Shahi sultanate emerged before the Safavid Shah 
Esma‘il I entered Tabriz in 1501), but that he was happy to commit to Safavid 
sovereignty, expressed by the khotba. The acceptance of Shi‘i khotba by a Sunni 
ruler made some uncomfortable. Riyazul Islam refers to the ‘absence of any 
reference to the Shi‘i Imams which is such a prominent feature of letters sent 
from the Deccan courts in Iran’.80 This tension further highlights a specific view 
of the meaning of the khotba as a sign of Deccani acceptance of Safavid 
sovereignty with all its symbols.81 
The contradiction, however, reflects a particular understanding of both creed 
and khotba which, again, may not be applicable to the early modern Deccan. 
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Elizabeth Lambourn argues that, in the early modern period, the idea of khotba 
was contested. Its concept changed over time and according to place, creating 
tensions between sovereigns, each with his own understanding of its meaning.82 
Sebastian Prange suggests that, on the late-fourteenth-century Malabar Coast, the 
khotba was not as much a statement of political sovereignty as it was a means for 
distant communities to cement commercial links.83 More generally, Dariusz 
Kołodziejczyk comments that the question of sovereignty itself has never been 
straightforward, but reflects aspects of control and ideology: the position of a 
local ruler, his ability to assert imperial control or concepts of inside/outside.84 
With these reservations in mind, I suggest that the Safavid khotba was, 
indeed, not necessarily a matter of sovereignty or religious incorporation. Rather, 
it was intended to link the sultanates to the Safavids as a measure of symbolic 
protection against the Mughals. In that sense, the Shi‘i references are not so much 
confessional as a declaration of political association in the polarized conditions 
of the early modern Muslim world. Reciting the Safavid khotba (or at least 
declaring a willingness to do so) and describing long-lasting bonds reflect 
Deccani lack of confidence in the face of the Mughal advance. This 
understanding of sovereign symbols as signifying a reaction to insecurities can 
also explain why Deccani minting appeared only in the 1580s. Pushkar Sohoni 
suggests that the late beginning of minting should be interpreted as a local 
response to the Mughal advance.85 The symbolic aspect of the khotba is made 
even clearer when we consider the distance of the Safavids from the Deccan, 
which meant that no actual help could have been sent. Taken together, the 
evidence supports the view that reciting the Safavid khotba in the Deccan 
represented an indicative means of demarcating territory in a highly contested 
environment, while rejecting Mughal designs. Moreover, acceptance of the 
khotba represents the choice of a distant symbol, which could not in reality curtail 
Deccani independence. 
In this case, then, what is the meaning of seeing the Deccan Sultanates as 
Shi‘i states, if indeed such a state existed at all? It is true that many of the rulers 
saw themselves as followers of that creed; for the Nezam Shahs and Qotb Shahs 
it continued throughout the tenure of the sultanate, whereas for the ‘Adel Shahs, 
only intermittently during the sixteenth century. Furthermore, correspondence 
between rulers of all three dynasties and the Safavids contained elements of 
acknowledging both Safavid sovereignty and a Shi‘i following. However, we 
cannot take the Shi‘ism of the sultanates beyond that. While using creed enables 
us to position the Deccan within the early modern Muslim world, it also produces 
certain misunderstandings regarding the meaning of this position. 
Furthermore, we should ask whether the religious affiliation of the ruler was 
the sole determinant of the orientation of the state, and even of courtly culture. I 
propose that it was not. In the Deccan, the majority of Muslims remained Sunni, 
and no evidence suggests that there was any attempt to impose a new creed on 
them. Moreover, the Shi‘i sensitivities of some rulers were operating in an 
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environment that encouraged, even endorsed, multiplicity. Even though Shi‘i 
allegiance was forcefully promoted in official writings, it did not prevent the 
ruler from pursuing other directions as well. This flexibility highlights the 
general continuities of courtly culture and its independence of Safavid or any 
other influence. More so, it emphasizes the flexibility of cultural and religious 
boundaries which continued in the Deccan into the seventeenth century. The idea 
that the Deccan Sultanates were solidly Shi‘i in the binary, Safavid-inspired way 
seems to be ill-suited for the Deccani environment. There is no doubt that the 
Safavid Empire, with its Shi‘i sensitivities and Persianate culture, played a 
significant role in the shaping of the Muslim sultanates of central India. But the 
sultanates’ response diverged from the ideas projected from Iran, as sultans 
fashioned their political and religious identities in a way that was uniquely 
Deccani. 
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